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Before 1988, "orthodox" policies (fiscal disci-  increases with the amount of government
pline and tight money) failed to bring inflation  liabilities that could, in a given period, be
down and induce a sustained economic recovery.  exchanged for foreign reserves.  For example, if
The Mexican stabilization plan announced in  the average maturity of domestic debt is low, as
December 1987 (the Pact) shows that the right  it was in Mexico at the beginning of the stabili-
combination of orthodox and "heterodox"  zation plan, this probability is high -and  thus
policies (for example, income policies) can meet,  also shows up in high interest premia between
and has met, both objectives.  peso-denominated and dollar-denominated debt.
Oks shows that although many orthodox  The Pact succeeded in stabilizing prices
adjustments - especially of fiscal policy and  without a recession, but a few loose ends remain:
domestic debt management --  were begun
before the Pact, considerable further adjusting  *  The sharp decline in private savings which
was needed before it could succeed.  To make  '-'s  not been fully offset by higher public saving,
the stabilization credible required significantly  causes many to question the sustainability of the
tighter fiscal policy and a lengthening of the  recent economic recovery.  In particular, it
maturities of domestic debt between 1988 and  makes Mexico more vulnerable to volatile
1990.  private capital flows.
A key factor behind high real interest rates  * The continued real appreciation of the peso
during the recent Mexican stabilization plan was  risks bringing a slowdown or recession over the
the initially low credibiliy of the fixed - and  medium term.
later the preannounced - exchange rate.  While
it is difficult to assess what establishes credibil-  In the shon term, Mexico may not have other
ity, we can hypothesize about the factor3 that  options than further tightening its fiscal and
may hamper it.  Crucial among them is the  monetary policies. Over the medium term,
consistency of the macroeconomic policy  however, a real peso depreciation appears
framework, where fiscal policy plays a key role.  necessary so that extra output from new invest-
Domestic debt management also matters as the  ment can be absorbed.
probability of a successful run on the peso
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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
Prior to  1988  "orthodox" policies,  fiscal discipline  and tight money,
failed to bring down inflation and induce a sustained economic recovery.  One
well established fact from the Mexican stabilization plan announced in December
1987, the Pact, is that a proper combination of  "orthodox" with  "heterodox"
policies, e.g.,  income policies, can achieve, and indeed has achieved, both
objectives.  The type of lesson  with which  we are  concerned here, though, focuses
on the  role  played by orthodox policies.  I show  that, despite the fact  that much
of the orthodox adjustements were in place before the Pa-t, the Pact and, in
particular, the  quasi-fixed  exchange  rate  associated  to  it,  required  considerable
further fiscal adjustment and able debt management before it could succeed.  I
conclude with a brief discussion of some medium-term problems created by the
quasi-fixed exchange rate regime and policy options.
The significant tightening of fiecal policy and lengthening of domestic
debt maturity  during  1988-90 were  crucial to  confront  the  initial  lack of
credibility of the stabilization program.  Without  these policies  high real
interest  rates, largely  associated  with lack  of credibility of the exchange rate
policy, could have derailed the stabilization program.  In 1988-89 the real
domestic interest service was twice more burdensome than the nominal foreign
interest service (even  though foreign public debt was more than twice the size
of domestic debt) and it absorbed  three-quarters of total tax revenue (compared
to 30% in 1985-87).  This implied that, despite the  initially tight fiscal
situation,  further fiscal  adjustment ;as  required.  But fiscal  adjustment  was not
enough.  Debt management also played a key role.  In  particular. the lengthening
of domestic debt maturing in the short term contributed to lessen unscheduled
devaluation expectations and, thus,  bring down interest  rates to  more manageable
levels.  The  lengthening  of  debt  maturity  lowered  unscheduled  devaluation
expectations by reducing the amount of government liabilities that in a given
period the government could have been forced to exchange for reserves (previous
exchange for  base money), e.g., if there was a speculative run on the peso.  The
empirical evidence also showed that foreign debt and debt service reduction,
brought  about  by  the  1989-90  debt  agreement  with  commercial  banks,  also
contributed  to lower  domestic interest  rates,  presumably through its  stabilizing
influence on foreign exchange markets.
The Pact  has succeded in stabilizing  prices, after running at  three digits
inflation dropped to an average of 23% in 1989-91, while avoiding a recession.
In fact, after modest growth in 1988 the economy has been growing at about 3-4%
in 1989-91.  A distinctive feature of Mexico's most recent economic recovery is
that it  has been driven by the  private sector.  A good measure of renewed private
sector confidence is provided by the massive private capital inflows (including
capital repatriation) that  Mexico received: US$18  billion  in 1989-90  and a
further US$17 billion estimated for 1991.  These inflows financed large foreign
reserve accumulation, about US$10 billion in 1990-91, as well as fast growing
private investment.
However,  private  consumption  also  boomed  and,  combined  with  higher
investment,  they explain the sharp current account deterioration observed since
1987.  From a macroeconomic point of view this  is largely explained by the4
favorable  effect  of a  more  apprecia'sd  peso  on investment,  by reducing  the  cost
of  capital  goods,  and  by  the  adverse  effect  of  a  more  appreciated  peso  on  private
saving.  In the short  term Mexico  may not have other options  than further
tightening  its monetary  and fiscal  policies  as its exchange  rate policy is
strongly  tied to the anti-inflationary  strategy  and the peso is l1.kely  to
continue appreciating  in real terms.  Over the medium term a  real peso
depreciation  appears  necessary,  however,  because  as time  goes  by the  risk  of a
recession  induced  by  an appreciating  real  exchange  rate  will  increase;  domestic
and foreign  investors  will require  a more  depreciated  exchange  rate to absorb
extra  output  from  their  new  investments.
Section  2  provides  the  basic  macroeconomic  background.  Section  3  discusses
the credibility  problem  presented  by the  exchange  rate policy;  Section  4 then
discusses the role of fiscal policy and debt management to overcome the
credibility  problem. Section  5  concludes  with  a  brief  examination  of the  risks
entailed  by the  current  exchange  rate  strategy  and  medium-term  policy  options.
2. THE "PACTO": STABILIZATION AND GROWTH RECCVERY.
In the 1970s fast economic  growth, abundant  foreign  finance,  and low
interest  rates  contributed,  despite  growing  public  expenditure,  to  keep  inflation
and  domestic  public  debt low. The  picture  changed  drastically  in  the 1980s  as
the  drying  up of foreign  finance,  massive  capital  flight,  lower  oil  prices  and
the  ensuing  output  stagnation  forced  the  government  to  unprecedented  fiscal  and
real exchange rate adjustments  (Figures  1  and 2).  Fiscal austerity was
characterized  by a drastic  reduction  in capital  expenses,  about 7 percentage
points  of  GDP  between  1981  and  1986,  as  well  as  a  large  increase  in  public  sector
prices. Fiscal  policy  was further  tightened  following  the 1985-86  oil crisis
(Figure  2).  However,  despite  these  adjustments  the large  transfer  to foreign
creditors,  equivilent  to 4.8%  of GDP on average  in 1983-87,  implied  increased
reliance on domt  --c  sources of  finance,  that is, on debt issue and on
inflationary  taxai  :. (Figures  3  and  4).  Despite  the  alleviation  brought  about
by foreign  debt  r:  .hedulings  in 1982-83,  1984-85  and  1986-87  per  capita  income
continued  dropping.  Inflation,  closely  associated  with  a  de-facto  targetting  of
the  real  exchange  rate,  kept  growing  (Figure  5). The  depreciated  exchange  rate,
though,  contributed  to improve  the  current  account  balance  which  turned  from  a
USS  16 billion  deficit  in  1981  to a  USS 4  billion  surplus  in 1987. Associated
with the growing  trade  surplus,  there  was a mild recovery  in 1987.  That  year
there  was also a boom in the stock  market.  Howe"er,  as in most world stock
markets,  it ended in a crash.  Strong speculation  against  the peso, partly
fuelled  by  heavy  foreign  debt-equity  swap  activity,  prompted  a  new  exchange  rate
and inflation crisis.5
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Figure  5
The  late  1987  inflation  episode  triggered  a change  in  the anti-inflation
strategy.  High  reserves,  low  real  wages  and  a  depreciated  exchange  rate  provided
adequate  conditions  for  the  use  of  nominal  anchors,  e.g.,  price-wage  controls  and
a fixed  exchange  rate,  to fight  inflation;  precisely  what  the  governiment  did  in
December  1987.  V'  The  government  signed  a Pact  of Economic  Solidarity  ("Pacto
de Solidaridad  Economical'  - PSE) with the business,  labor and agriculture
sectors. The  Pact,  which  combined  "orthodox"  policy  instruments  (e.g.,  fiscal
policy)  with "heterodox"  policy  instruments  (e.g.,  income  policy),  was  aimed  at
stabi±izing  the economy  while  avoiding  a recession. It entailed  monetary  and
fiscal  tightening,  an initial  devaluation  and  wage  adjustment  and  a subsequent
fixing of these variables untfl.  the end of February 1988, limited price
2/ See  Ortiz (1990).7
adjustments for all goods in a "basic"  commodity basket, and an acceleration of
the process  of  trade liberalization (started  in  1985),  e.g..,  maximum tariffs  were
halved to 20% and import licensing was reduced from 100% to about 15%.  _n  view
of the initial success the Pact was extended in March, May, August and October
1988  da-ficto  freezing  minimum  wages  (after a  small  initial  adjustment),
control!eJ and public sector prices and the exchange rate for the rest of 1988.
By and large  the Pact objectives were attained: inflation  dropped from 67%
during the  second half of  1987 to 6% during the  same period  in 1988 and  a
recession was avoided.  Economic activity started  to pick  up  in the last  quarter
of 1988, after political uncertainties surrounding the mid-year presidential
elections and  the future  course of  economic  policy receded.  In  December 1988  the
new  government agreed  with business,  labor  and  agriculture sector  representatives
to a new phase of the Pact: the renamed Pact for Economic Growth and Stability
("Pacto  de Estabilidad y Crecimiento Economico"l  - PECE).  The new Pact continued
with the stabilization objective but incorporated explicitly the objectives of
foreign debt reducticn and growth recovery.
Fiscal  policy  remained tight,  the  primary fiscal surplus  averaged  8% of  GLP
in 1988-90,  white public sector  prices, controlled prices and  minimum wages were
moderately adjusted (Figure 6).  Economic policy under the new Pact, and under
its  subsequent  renovations (the  last  one in  November 1991),  brought several  other
innovations.  First, it introduced a preannounced daily devaluation of the peso
against the dollar at the rate of 1 peso a day, equivalent to  a 16% annual
devaluation, gradually reduced thereafter,  to a 2.4% annual  devaluation in 1992.
Second, financial liberalization was deepened leading both to a sharp increase
in deposits and credit; since 1989 interest rates were set competitively by
banks,  credit  ceilings and  legal  reserve  requirements  were  eliminated (banks  were
required to hold 30% of their assets in government bonds and/or cash reser-es).
Third, in 1989-90 the new administration renegotiated its external commercial
debt  bringing  about  substantial  debt  and  debt  service  reduction;  several
agreements signed with the IMF, World Bank, Japan and Paris Club in early 1989
paved the  way and provided the  resources for the  commercial debt  reduction
agreement. The debt  relief  package,  which restructured  US$48  billion of  Mexico's
foreign debt, reduced the net transfer Mexico needs to make to its creditors by
slightly less than 2% of GDP over the 1989-1994 period on average; half of this
amount was due to the lengthening of maturity implied by the deal, 0.5% of GDP
was due to net interest savings and the rest was due to new money.
The new Pact or PECE was overall 'succesfull.  In 1989 inflation averaged
20%  and, for  the first  time since  the debt crisis  erupted, per capita real income
growth was positive.  Economic growth accelerated, driven by private investment
and, to a lesser extent, private consumption, to an average 3.7% in 1989-91.
Inflation  rebounded somewhat,  to 30% in 1990.  This,  though, was by and large  the
result  of a flexibilization of  the Pact.  Public sector  prices and  private sector
controlled prices were adjusted several times between late 1989 and late 1991,
while various  controlled  prices  were effectively  decontrolled.  In  1991  inflation
resumed a downward path despite continued  price flexibilization and substantial
public price adjustments. However, inflation  gains came along  with a strong  real
peso appreciation and a sharp deterioration in the non-oil trade balance.8
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3. POLICY CREDIBILITY, DEBT REPUDIATION RISKS AND HIGH  INTEREST RATES.
Despite  the  rapid  success  in  bringing  down  inflation,  domestic  real
interest rates during the first two years of the Pact were extremely high: on
average in excess of 30k.  High real interest  rates, rather than the debt stock,
threatened  the stabilization  program  by  increasing  the  cost of  servicing domestic
debt, and by hindering investment and, hence, the economic recovery.  In this
section I argue that behind high real interest rates was: i) the initially low
credibility about the fixed/preannounced exchange rate and, to a lesser degree,
ii) fears  of explicit debt repudiation.  The initial lack  of credibility led the
public  to systematically  overestimate  the  exchange  rate  devaluation, i.e.,  Mexico
in  the late 1980's  provided a fresh  example of the "peso  problem" (Krasker  1980).
A survey of devaluation expectations conducted by INEGI (the  National Institute
of Statistics) illustrates this  (Figure 7).  In the next section I will argue
that Mexico's tight fiscal  policy and able  debt  management, helped eventually to
bring  down  real  interest  rates.  In  other  countries  undergoing  similar
stabilization  strategies, e.g.,  Brazil and  Argentina,  but without  the  same
ability to tighten fiscal policy and/or manage public debt, high real interest
rates led to situations of fast growing domestic debt growth and unsustainable
exchange rate/inflation targets (Beckerman 1991).
At the core of the anti-inflation strategy  was a first fixed and later on
quasi-fixed exchange rate (a  preannounced declining rate of  devaluation).  This,
along with price and wage controls, provided nominal anchors  for prices and,
thus, for inflation.  However, at least initially financial markets did not
believe  that  the  fixed/qua.,i-fixed  exchange  rate,  and  for  that  matter  the
stabilization strategy itself, was going to be maintained.  This lack  of policy
credibility led to high devaluation expectations and exchange rate uncertainty
as  measured by  the  differential  between interest  rates on  peso-denominated public
debt (Cetes) and interest rates on dollar-indexed domestic debt (Pagafes) plus9
the rate of preannounced devaluation (Figure  8).
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A different type of risk, also reflected in  high interest rates  during the
first  phases  of  the  Pact,  was  associated  with  the  fear  of  explicit  debt
repudiation.  Explicit debt repudiation refers to default through taxation or
sheer debt  repudiation;  in contrast with  implicit  debt repudiation  through
unanticipated devaluation/inflation.  The  explicit  debt repudiation risk  premium
can  be  measured by  the interest  differential  between dollar-indexed  domes,tic  debt
(Pagafes) and a risk-free dollar  interest rates, we  use  as a prox.'  the  US
Treasury Bill.  This premium rose substantially during the first phase of the
Pact and remained large until mid 1989 (Figure 9).  Explicit debt repudiation
fears in  Mexico can be traced back to the 1982 forced conversion of dollar bank
deposits at an artificially low exchange rate.10
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Both  interest  premia,  the  Cetes-Pagafes  and  the  Pagafes-TJS  Treasury  Bi.  1.
interest  differentials,  dropped  sharply  in  1988-91.  Their  behavior,  however.,  was
driven  by  different  policy  factors  and  indeed  exhibit  different  patterns. While
both interest  differentials  ffaasure  debt  repudiation  risks  (the  former  implicit
and the latter  explicit),  and  to that  extent  are similarly  affected  by policy
variables  influencing  the solvency  of government,  the Cetes-Pagafes  interest
differential  more  specifically  measures  unscheduled  devaluation
expectations/exchange  rate  uncertainty  which  is  influenced  directly  by  movements
and  expectations  in foreign exchange markets.  For  example, unschieduled
devaluation  expectations/exchange  rate uncertainty  may  be  driven by  the
perception  of  growing  external  imbalances  or  by  the  risk  that  a  confidence  crisis
may leave  the  central  bank  without  enough  foreign  exchange  reserves  to sustain
the  preannounced  exchange  rate,  rather  than  by solvency  considerations.
4.  FISCAL  POLICY  AND  DEBT  MANAGEMENT.
Flow  did  fiscal  policy  and  debt  management  contribute  to reduce  the  risk  of
explicit  debt repudiation  and/or  devaluation  expectations  and, through  them,
interest  rates? These  issues  are  examined  respectively  in Sub,sections  4.1  and
4.2.
4.1  Factors  Behind  Explicit  Debt  ReRudiation  Risk  Premia.
What lies behind explicit  debt repudiation  fears as measured by the
interest  differential  between  dollar-indexed  domestic  debt (Pagafes)  a.-d  US
Treasury  Bills?  The likelihood  of debt  repudiation  depends  on the ability  as
well  as the  willingness  of the  government  to service  its  debt.  A goverrnment'swillingness to service debt stems from a variety of factors affecting costs and
benefit-  of  default.  However,  while  the  benefits  from  default  are
straigkicforward,  the  reduced  debt service,  costs are  more difficult  to assess and
measure and, in any case, governments may not be always careful in evaluating
them.  It is easier to assess the abilit,'  to service public debt,  i.e., the
perceived solvency of government.  A government's ability to service  &  given
stock of debt can be assessed by comparing the present discounted values of
future  debt  service  obligations  and  future  primary  (non-inter--c)  fiscal
surpluses.
The risk of  explicit debt repudiation, e.g., through an unscheduled tax on
debt, may alao be affected  by debt management-specific factors such as the level
of debt indexation.  For  a given debt  Ltock (of  indexed  and non-indexed debt) the
higher the degree of indexation  the less likely  that non-indexed (nominal)  debt
will be  implicitly repudiated thrcagh  inflation  (as the base for implicitly
repudiating debt through inflation narrows) and, thus, the more likely that, if
the government is  to  repudiate its  debt, it  will do it  explicitly (Calvo-Guidotti
1990).  Thus, the explicit debt repudiation risk premium may increase with the
level of inde dtion even if the overall risk of debt rgpudiation is unchanged.
Casual  evidence supports  this hypothesis.  In 1988  as  the share  of dollar-indexed
debt rose  from almost  zero to more  than  5% of  domestic debt  (indexed debt
includes  dollar-indexed Pagafes  and inflation-indexed  Ajustabonos in Figure 10),
the explicit  debt  repudiation risk premium,  approximated by  the  Pagafes-US
Treasury bill.  interest differential, more than doubled  (Figure 9).  This may
explain the subsequent  reluctance of the government  to keep issuing indexed debt
(Figure 10).
Another important  factor  influencing  the  risk  of  domestic  debt  repudiation,
both explicit and implicit,  was the foreign  debt agreement.  In July 1989, when
the agreement for restructuring commercial foreign debt was formally announced,
both implicit and  explicit debt repudiation risk  premia dropped sharply (Figures
8  and 9).  The debt agreement reduced the net transfer Mexico needs to make to
its commercial creditors and brought substantial debt and debt service relief.
Lower transfers and debt relief enhanced Mexico's ability to service all public
debt, Zoreign and domestic, thus, reduc.ng fears of both domestic and foreign
debt repudiation.  In turn, debt relief and the significantly lengthened debt
maturity  helped  to  dispel  fears  of  new  debt  renegotiations  thus  reducing
macroeconomic and, in particular, exchange rate uncertainty. 3'
To  test  these hypotheses about  the  factors  that influence  the  explicit debt
repudiation risk  premium we run a linear  regression  with the Pagafes-US Treasury
Bill interest  differential, the proxy for the debt repudiation risk premium, as
dependent variable.  Based on the above discussion, the explanatory variables
were, apart from the constant term, the primary fiscal surplus lagged up to two
months, the  degree of debt indexation  and a  dummy for  the foreign debt  agreement.
A regression wa: run for  the March 1987-December  1990 period using monthly data.
To calculate the net present value of  primary surpluses  agents require  knowledge
2/  S. van  Wijnbergen 1991  a) analyzes the direct and indirect (domestic)  effects
of the Brady deal: indirect gains (via lower interest rates) were at least as
large as the reduction in the external transfer to foreign creditors.12
of future  primary surpluses  which,  of course, they  don't know.  The most they may
know is the value of current and lagged primary surpluses, the proxy which in
fact we used as regressor.  The  degree of debt indexation, in  turn, was  measured
by the  ratio of  indexed to non-indexed  debt.  Indexed debt  comprised  both
inflation and dollar-indexed debt instruments.  The dummy for  the debt agreement
took value one after the deal announcement in July 1989.
The hypotheses described above are supported by the econometric eviderce
reported in Annex 1.  The additional tightening of fiscal policy since 1988,
captured by increases in real primary fiscal su:  -.uses, led to lower explicit
debt repudiation  risk premia.  Increases  (reductions) in the  level of debt
indexation were associated with increases (reductions)  of debt repudiation risk
premia.  Finally, as expected, the 1989 foreign debt agreement (captured by a
dummy) reduced risk premia.
Public  Bond Structure.
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4.2 Factors Behind Devaluation Expectations/Exchange Rate Uncertainty.
We  now  turn  to  factors  underlying policy  credibility  as measured  by
unscheduled devaluation expectations/exchange rate uncertainty.  Unscheduled
devaluation expectations/exchange rate uncertainty were extremely high in 1988,
declined in 1989, particularly during the months following the announcement of
the debt deal, and then fell again substantially after the first quarter of 1990
(Figure  8). Factors  governing  unscheduled  devaluation  expectations  are  difficult
to identify.  However, we know that if the government is  to resist a speculative
attack on the currency,  whether originating from  private misperceptions or not,
at least the stock of base money must be backed by foreign exchange reserves.
In  the sase  of  Mexico, though,  where the  government had frequent  and high funding
requlirements,  e.g.,  domestic  public  debt,  equivalent  to approximately  20%  of  GDP,
had  an  average  maturity of less  than a  month, non-monetary government obligations
also mattered due to their potential impact on base money growth.  To amortize13
short-term debt the government could be forced  to issue more baRe money if, for
example, investors lacking credibility are unwilling to take any interest rate
since they believe that the rate of devaluation would exceed it.  In this case,
the stock of reserves may not suffice to back the stock of base money expected
for the end of the period  (even if the initial stock of base money  is fully
backed by reserves) and, thus, the probability that a speculative attack may
force a devaluation increases.
Thus, one alternative which governments have to reduce the probability of
a succesful run  on their currency is  to lengthen  domestic debt maturity, a point
made by  Giavazzi-Pagano (1989). Giavazzi-Pagano showed in  fact that lengthening
debt maturity could help to rule out equilibria with positive probability of
devaluation.  In their  framework, though, the collapse of the exchange rate
regime is prompted by the growing debt  service that results  from having  to
refinance  short-term  debt at  high interest  rates  when a confidence  crisis arises.
The variable which we propose to explain  the probability of an unscheduled
devaluation  (the interest premium of peso-denominated over dollar-denominated
domestic debt), 1 %us,  is the difference between the sum of tne stock of public
debt  maturing in the  month and the stock of base  money on one hand, and the stock
of foreign exchange reserves on the other hand.
In order to  assess empirically this  hypothesis we postulate  a binary
stochastic  process  to  describe  the  formation  of  unscheduled  devaluation
expectations.  We  then  run  a  regression  of  the  Cetes-Pagafes  interest
differential  (adjusted for the  preannounced  devaluation) where  the  process
describing unscheduled devaluation expectations provides the regressors.  Under
the  binary  process  agents  either  expect  no  devaluation  (on  top  of  the
preannounced one) or a fixed unscheduled devaluation.  The probability of an
unscheduled  devaluation  depends  on  the  variable  defined  above,  i.e.,  the
difference of the sum  of public debt maturing in  the month and base money on one
hand, and foreign exchange reserves on the other hand.  The size of the fixed
unscheduled devaluation, in turn, can either be exogenous or endogenous.  We
first endogenized the size of the devaluation on the degree of exchange rate
appreciation with respect to the average 1987  real exchange rate level but found
it  statistically  insignificant. So  we finally  assumed  an  exogenous  and arbitrary
fixed  30%  unscheduled  devaluation.  In  short,  unscheduled  devaluation
expectations were  modelled  as the  endogenous probability  of  an unscheduled
devaluation  times  the 30%  unscheduled  devaluation. A full  and  formal  description
of the model is provided in Annex 2.
However,  the  Cetes-Pagafes  interest  differential  (adjusted  for  the
preannounced  devaluation)  does  not  only  capture  unscheduled  devaluation
expectations.  If investors are risk-averse it also captures an exchange rate
uncertainty premium.  In order to evaluate empirically the existence  of an
exchange rate uncertainty premium we incorporated a proxy for exchange rate
uncertainty,  the  variance  of  unscheduled  devaluation  expectations, along  with the
binary process describing unscheduled devaluation expectations, as a regressor
in  the  Cetes-Pagafes  interest  differential  regression.  The  variance  of
unscheduled devaluation expectations is easy to calculate since the latter is a
stochastic binary process (see  Annex 2).14
The regression,  which also  includes  a dummy for  the 1989  foreign debt  deal,
was estimated with non-linear least squares for the October 1988-December 1990
period using monthly data.  While the Pact  was first announced in late 1987, the
period prior to the July 1988 elections was characterized by great political
uncertainty.  The  course  of  economic  policy  became  apparent  a  few  months
afterwards and the new phase of the Pact, the PECE, was formally announced in
December 1988. The econometric results are in Annex 3 and discussed below.
The econometric analysis supports  our main hypothesis.  A reduction in  the
sum  of public debt  maturing in  the month and  base money relative to the stock  of
foreign  exchange  reserves lowers  unscheduled  devaluation  expectations.  Since  the
lengthening  of  domestic  debt  maturity  (Figure  11),  induced  through  the
introduction of "Bondes" (see  Figure 10)  4',  was the main factor influencing the
above variable it  was also the main factor  behind the sharp  decline in the peso-
dollar interest differential during the period.
There  was  no  econometric  evidence  of  agents  demanding  a  premium  for
exchange rate uncertainty, as  measured by the variance of the postulated process
for devaluation expectations.  The dummy for the foreign debt agreement had the
expected sign but was only significant at an 80% level of confidence.  Other
explanatory variables tested but found to be statistically insignificant were:
for  the probability of devaluation, the primary fiscal surplus; and for  the size
of the expected devaluation, the level of real exchange rate appreciation with
respect to a given base year.





y  The  lengthening  of debt maturity was  first  attained by the introduction of mediun-term  (2 to 3 year) floating rate bonds  indexed  to the 28 day Cetes, catled Bondes,  in mid-1988. In 1990,  the lengthening  of debt maturity responded  to a shift  from 28 day Cetes into 90, 180  and  365  days  Cetes.  The  180  and  365  Cetes  were  introduced
in 1990  and  the long-term  (up to 5 years) inflation-indexed bonds,  called Ajustabonos,  were  introduced  in  late
1989.15
one shortcoming of  the econometric approach followed is  that debt maturity
is treated as exogenous.  Since in fact it may be endogenous this may be the
source of an inefficient estimation.  If investors lack confidence  hey may
prefer short-term debt either because it is  more costly to repudiate or because
existing short-term debt  s paid before long-term debt (Guidotti-Kumar 1991).
However,  while an  endogenous debt  maturity cannot in  general be discarded, in  the
case of Mexico the government played a key role in determining the maturity
structure  by  deciding  the relative  price at  which  bonds  with different  maturities
were sold.  The government received offers for given amounts of the different
bonds at a  given interest  rate.  In  the  primary bond auctions the  government then
decided the cutoff interest rate for each bond which often implies that some
bonds were undersuscribed and others are oversuscribed.  Thus, the government
could  have  induced a  lengthening of debt  maturity,  i.e.,  set  the maturity
exogenously, by increasing the quota for longer term maturities and by raising
the cutoff interest rate at which it took offers.
5.  EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, PRIVATE SAVING AND GROWTH.
The key macroeconomic factor currently challenging the sustainability of
Mexico's economic recovery is  the  declining  trend in  nominal private saving.  Did
real, as  opposed to  nominal, private saving  also decline?  If so,  can the decline
in private saving be traced back to government policies?  While there are no
obvious policy distortions  I argue that the anti-inflation bias of Mexico's
exchange rate policy has led to strong real peso appreciation after 1987.  Has
the sharp real peso appreciation exerted an adverse impact on private saving?
If  so, is  the  current e.change  rate policy  compatible  with a sustainable  economic
recovery?  And if not, what are the main policy options?
Mexico's nominal domestic private  saving declined about  10 percentage
points of GDP between 1983-87 and 1991.  Although much of this decline can be
ascribed  to lower inflation (as  nominal  interest  payments received  by  the private
sector have fallen with  inflation) an inflation-adjusted measure  of private
saving (obtained residually from the current account deficit and real public
saving) still shows a marked decline in private saving.  Based on an estimated
US$11-12 billion current account deficit for 1991, about half of the current
account  deterioration  since  1983-87 was  due  to  higher  investment  and  the
remainder was due to lower real private saving as real public saving actually
improved (Table  1).  It is worth noting that only about one-third of the decline
in real private saving, and the corresponding increase in public saving, was
accounted for by a reduction in the domestic real public debt service.
The  decline  in  private  saving  may  have  been  caused  by  legitimate
macroeconomic factors,  e.g.,  Mexico's improved  economic  prospects could  have  lead
to an upward revision of permanent income and/or reduced uncertainty.  It is
therefore potentially risky to introduce policy changes in response to lower
private savings, particularly, in the absence of obvious policy distortions.
However, it is  conceivable that  the anti-inflation  bias of  Mexico's exchange rate
policy has  been largely  responsible for  the sharp  real  peso appreciation observed
in  1988-91.  The  government  first  fixed  the  exchange  rate  and  later  on16
preannounced daily devaluations at a rate which was systematically below the
domestic-foreign inflation differential.  Below I argue that the decline  in
private  saving  was in  fact induced  by such  policy-induced  real peso appreciation.
Table 1. Sources of the Current Account Deterioration Between 1983-87 and 1991
(in  percentage points of GDP)
1. Increase in Public Saving  5.4
2. Increase in Private Saving  -8.8
3. Net Increase in Domestic Saving (=1+2)  -3.4
4. Net Increase in Investment  3.5
5. Change in Current Account Balance (=3-4)  -6.9
Notes.  1/  Aggregate  investment  in  constant  1980  pesos.
3/  Public  saving  is  defined  as  the  sun  of  the  inflation-adjusted
economic  baLance  and  public  investment.
4/  Private  saving  is  obtained  residuaLly.
5/  1991  figures  based  on  the  fotlowing  estimates:  a  current  account
deficit  equivalent  to  4.5%  of  GDP,  a  12.2  rate  of  investment
growth,  a  4%  rate  of  GDP  growth,  an  operational  fiscal  surplus
equivalent  to  3%  GDP  and  a  5%  public  investment-GDP  ratio.
Sources.  "Indicadores",  Banco  de  Mexico  1991  and  own  estimates.
The real peso appreciation has been a key factor  behind the deterioration
of Mexico's non-oil trade balance (regression 1 in Table 2); between 1987 and
1991  the  current account  balance turned from  US$4 billion surplus into  a US$11-12
billion deficit.  From a macroeconomic point of view this was accounted for  both
by the favorable effect of a more appreciated peso on investment and by the
adverse effect of a more appreciated peso on private saving (regressions 2 and
3  in Table 2).  There is evidence  that the  positive impact on private investment
of a real peso appreciation stems, by and large, from the implied reduction in
the cost of capital goods  (van  Wijnbergen (1991) and Warner  (1991)).  Less is
known about the negative impact  of the real peso appreciation on private saving
although there is empirical evidence for other countries that a real exchange
rate appreciation (devaluation)  is  expansionary (contractionary),  e.g., Edwards
(1986). One possible interpretation is Diaz-Alejandro's (1965)  hypothesis that
devaluations are contractionary  because it redistributes income from low savers
to  high  savers.  Another  possibility  is  that  an  anticipated  real  peso
appreciation  leads  to  lower  domestic  real  interest  rates  which,  in  turn,
discourage saving. 5
S/  However, the impact of real interest rates on private saving was found to be
statistically insignificant (see  note of Table 2).17
Table 2. Macroeconomic Impact of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations.
Method of Estimation: OLS
Regression 1.
X-M  =  -2735  + 0.715*(X-M). 1 + 2234*REER  - 533*D2  - 596*D?  - 247*D4
(-5.7)  (15.7)  (6.6)  (-^3.9) (-4.4)  (-1.8)
SMPL: 1980.1-1990.4  R 2 = 0.97  D-W  1.92
Regression 2.
Ip/Y =  0.0425  + 0.889*(Ip/Y).,  - 0.02*REER
(2.3)  (10.7)  (-2.4)
SMPL: 1983.1-1990.4  R  =  0.86  D-W =  2.02
Regression 3.
Cp/Yd =  0.0352 + 0.531*(Cp/Yd) 1 - 0.0325*REER - 0.0329*D4 + 0.0184*BRADY
(4.0)  (4.1)  (-2.3)  (-6.7)  (2.7)
SMPL: 1983.1-1990.4  R 2 =  0.81  D-W =  1.92
Notation:  X-M deflated  non-oiL  trade  surplus
REER  real  exchange  rate  of  Mexico  vis  a  vis  US  (Producer  Prices)
D2,  D3,  D4 seasonal  dummies
ip/Y  private  investment  GDP  ratio
Cp/Yd ratio  of  private  consumption  to  disposable  income  (defined  as
quarterly  GDP  minus  taxes)
BRADY  a  dummy  which  takes  value  1  since  the  second  haLf  of  1989  to
account  for  the  foreign  debt  agreement  for  debt  reduction
t-statistics  in  parenthesis
Note: real  interest  rates  (measured  as  Cetes  minus  past  inflation)  were  also
tested  in  regressions  2  and  3  but  found  to  be  statistically  insignificant.
The decline of private saving could  put at  risk MexicoIs economic recovery
as  the accumulation of  external liabilities  is  not backed  by additional resources
to service them in the future.  This problem could be exacerbated if the real
peso appreciation shifts an increasing portion of investment, the other factor
behind large current account deficits, to the non-tradable sector.  While the
sustainability  of  current  account  deficits  ultimately depends  on  the  availability
of foreign capital,  which in 1990-91 over-financed the current account deficit,
the volatile nature nature of recent capital  inflows makes Mexico extremely
vulnerable to  domestic and  external shocks  even in  the short  term.  Besides, over
the medium term other problems may arise.  The initially  expansionary impact of
a real peso appreciation on domestic aggregate demand is likely, over time, to
be offset by the  adverse employment effects of a shift  from goods produced
domestically  to  foreign  goods  (precisely,  due  to  the  ongoing  real  peso
appreciation),  i.e.,  a  J-curved  response  of  aggregate  demand  to  the  peso18
appreciation  over  the medium term.  In short, Mexico's  main  risks are  its
increase dependence  on  volatile  capital  inflows over the  short term  and a
recession over the medium term.
What are  the policy options?  Mexico already has tight fiscal  and monetary
policies in place.  A further tightening may not be effec-ive, in the case of
monetary policy  (as sterilization could encourage more capital inflows), nor
efficient,  in the  case  of  fiscal policy  (due to  social  and  infrastructure
bottlenecks).  In  the short  term, though,  Mexico may not have other options than
further tightening its  monetary and fiscal policies as its  exchange rate policy
is strongly tied to the anti-inflationary strategy and already committed for
1992.  Increasing  the  rate of devaluation  while the economy is  booming is,  in any
case, likely  to be more inflationary and, thus, less effective, than otherwise.
Over the medium term a gradual real peso depreciation appears necessary,
however,  because  as  time  goes  by  the  risk  of  a  recession  induced  by  an
appreciating real exchange  rate will increase.  In particular, foreign investors
will require a more depreciated exchange rate  to absorb extra output from their
new investments.19
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ANNEX 1. Explicit Debt Repudiation. Econometric Results
Arbitrage between peso- and dollar-denominated domestic debt  (respectively
Cetes and Pagafes) implies:
(1)  (1 +  R.)  =  (1 +  Rp)*(l +  e)*(l  +  a*a)
where: R,, is the rate of return of asset c (Cetes) and p (Pagafes)
a  is a measure of exchange rate uncertainty
a  is the coefficient of risk aversion
e  is the expected rate of devaluation
Similarly, arbitrage between domestic dollar-denomin,  -C  debt (Pagafes)  and
the assumed riskless US Treasury Bill implies:
(2)  (1 +  R,) =  (1 +  RTs)*(l +  E)*(l  +  p*r)
where: RT  is the rate of return on "safe" US Treasury Bills
Z  is the expected rate of Pagafe repudiation
r  is a measure of debt repudiation uncertainty
p  is the coefficient of risk aversion
In order to assess the impact of fiscal policy on explicit debt repudiation
expectations, we hypothetize that debt .- epudiation expectations  is a  linear
function of lagged primary fiscal surpluses and of the degree of indexation:
(3)  Z =  0  +  02*Y + O3*I
where: Z  is the expected rate of Pagafe repudiation
y  is the lagged primary fiscal surplus
Ol 02  and  03  are  constant  terms
I  is  the  degree  of  domestic  indexation  (dollar  and  inflation-
indexed)
We then  substitute  (3)  in  equation  (1)  to  obtain  an  expression  for  the  Pagafe-
US  Treasury  Bill  interest  differential:
(4)  (1  +  Rp)/(l  +  RTB) - 1 = 0  +  02*Y  +  03*I
Equation  (4)  is  estimated  using  OLS.  Up  to  3  lags  for  variable  y  were
initially  considered.  A dummy  for  the  foreign  debt  agreement  is  included  in  the
regression  and,  since  we  detected first order serial autocorrelation, we also
included  the  dependent  variable  lagged one period as a regressor.  Since the
Pagafe-US  T.Bill  differential  is not directly affected by exchange rate policy,
to the extent that  both are dollar denominated assets, the period of analysis is
March 1987-December 1990; Pagafes were first issued in late 1986.  Results for
the resulting regression, equation (3)  below, are reported in Table 1.
(5)  (1  +  Rp)/(l  +  RmT)  - 1 =0  +  01*y1  +  02- 2*Y2 +  03*1 +21
Cl*[(1 +  R,. 1)/(1 +  RTBZ)  - 13  +  C2*Dl
Table 1. Estimates Rearession 3.
Method of Estimation: OLS.
Sample: March 1987-December 1990.
Coefficient  Standard Error  T-Statistic
*0  0.108  0.036  2.976
7t  -4.464E-05  2.213E-05  -2.018
022  -4.114E-05  2.220E-05  -1.853
*3  0.857  0.433  1.979
cl  0.608  0.101  6.019
c 2 -0.053  0.020  -2.422
R-squared  0.716
Durbin-Watson Stat.  1.821
Log likelihood  68.687
F-statistic  19.669
All  variables  were statistically  significant  and  their  coefficients  carried
the expected sign, i.e., higher indexation and lower primary fiscal surpluses
raised debt repudiation fears.
ANNEX 2. A Model of Devaluation Expectations/Uncertainty
We assume  that an unscheduled (not  preannounced) exchange rate devaluation x,
has the binary distribution:
(1)  xt  2  X 1 (constant)  with probability  Pt  t =  1...T
=  0  with probability  (1 - p t)
Thus, the expected value of x,  is:
(2)  E(x,)  =  xt*p,
And its variance (Mood  Graybill (1963)) is:
(3) c(x,)  =  E(x, 2) - [E(x,)  ]2
=  Xt
2*Pt  - Xt
2*p 
2
The total expected devaluation has  a certain component, the preannounced
devaluation rate x?, and an uncertain component, x 1:
(4)  e  =  (1 +  x1P)*(l  +  E(x,))  - 1
Thus, based on equations (3) and (4)  and equation (1)  of Annex 1, and taking22
the variarnce  of x,  as the proxy for exchange rate uncertainty, the Cetes-Pagafes
interest differantial adjusted for the preannounced rate of devaluation is:
(5)  (1 +  R)/(l +  Rp)*(l  +  x,P)  =  (1 +  E(x,))*(l  +  a*a(x,))
(1  +  x,*p 1)*(l  +  a*(x, 2 *p,  - xt2*p,2) )
We may focus  on the particular case in  which the probability of a devaluation
of size x,,  p,  is described by the following linear process:
(6) Pt  =  HM +  IJ 2*Yt  i  ,3*z
where:  pl,  P2 and  I3  are  constant  coefficients
y, z are explanatory variables, e.g., domestic debt
The  size  of  the  devaluation  x, can  be  either  considered  exogenous  or
endogenous, e.g., on a measure of real exchange rate appreciation:
(7)  x,  =  rl  +  r,*e,
where: TI,  T2  are constant coefficients
e  is an explanatory variable
Substituting (6) and (7) in (5):
(8) (1 +  R)/(1  +  Rp)*(1 +  x,p)  (  1 +  (T1 +  T2*e,)*(Iju  +  8J 2*YI  +  I3*Z)
*tl +  a*[  (T(  +  T2 *e.)
2*(JUl  +  p 2*Yt  +  J 3*Zt)  -
(T  +  T 2 *e,)
2
*(Ijl  +  IJ 2*Yt  +  ,J 3*Zt) 21}
ANNEX 3. Devaluation ExDectations/Uncertaintv. Econometric Estimation
Equation (8) of Annex 2 was estimated econometrically employing non-linear
least squares (NLS).  All regressions were run for the period October  1988-
December 1990.  The  dependent variable is  based  on annualized rates for Cetes and
Pagafes of 28 days.  Interest  rates for  month t are measured at the end of month
(t-l) and the  preannounced  devaluation for month  t  is equal  to the  actual
devaluation  of the controlled  exchange rate between the beginning and the end of
month t.  The initial set of explanatory variables is: the difference between
public debt maturing in  the month plus base money and foreign exchange reserves
(variable z); the primary fiscal surplus (variable y); and the degree of real
peso appreciation compared to the average 1987 level (variable  e).  Variables z
and y are real, deflated by the CPI, and variable e measures the difference
between the real exchange rate of the peso against the US dollar in the period
and the real exchange rate in 1987 as a percentage of the real exchange rate in
1987.  A dummy was included in all regreasions for the Brady deal' the dummy
takes  value  0  up  to  June  1989  and  value  1  thereafter.  When  serial23
autocorrelation was  detected the dependent variable was  included lagged one
period as a regressor.
The expected signs for the coefficients are:
(1)  a >  0  ,  P2  <  0  ,  P3  >  0  ,  T2 >  0
The primary fiscal surplus and real  exchange rate appreciation were not found
to be statistically significant factors of, respectively, the probability of a
devaluation and the size  of the expected devaluation.  The regression was, thus,
reestimate(.  excluding these variables assuming that the size of the expected
devaluation was a fixed 30% and the probability of devaluation depended only on
variable z.  In the resulting regression the coefficient a was statistically
insignificant (it  was also insignificantly different from zero in the previous
regressions).  So we re-ran the regression eliminating a, i.e.,  making it equal
to zero.  We finally re-ran the regression  without pi  sinci it was also found to
be  insignificantly different from zero.  After  sequentially eliminating all
statistically insignificant  coefficients, as described above, we were left with
the following regression reported in Table 1:
(2)  [(1 + R.)  /(1 + RP)*(1  + x 1P) - 1]  =  0.3*(/1 2*Z.) + c1*D1  +
2* (3. + R..)/(1  +  R,,)*(1  +  x,.P) - 1
Table 1. Estimates Rearession 2.
Method of Estimation: NLS (Non-Linear  Least Squares).
Sample: October 1988-December 1990.
Coefficient  Standard Error  T-Statistic
P2  0.226  0.0752  2.998
c,  -0.017  0.0174  -0.974
c 2 0.308  0.1993  1.546
R-squared  0.272
Durbin-Watson Stat.  1.686
Log likelihood  46.728
F-statistic  4.481
It follows that only variable z  was a significant factor with the expected
sign of the Cetes-Pagafes interest differential (adjusted for the preannounced
devaluation).  There is  no evidence,  under  the  present model, of agents  demanding
a premium for exchange rate uncertainty, i.e., agents are not risk-averse.  The
dummy  for  the  foreign  debt  agreement  has  the  expected  sign  but  is  only
significant at an 80% level of confidence.Poliky  Research  Working  Pa.per  Series
Cuntact
:GS  AWhor  Da  for p=
WPS814  Finance,  Growth,  and Public  Policy  Mark  Gertler  December  1991  W. Pitayatonakarn
Andrew  Rose  37666
WPS815  Governance  and Economy:  A Review Deborah  Brautiga.n  December  1991  Z. Kranzer
37494
WPS816  Economic  Consequences  of German  Gerhard  Pohl  December  1991  CECSE
Reunification:  12 Months  After the Big  37188
Bang
WPS817  How  Does  Brady-Type  Commercial  Mohua  Mukherjee  December  1991  Y. Arellano
Debt Restructuring  Work?  31379
WPS818  Do Rules  Control  Power?  GATT  J. Michael  Finger  January  1992  N. Artis
Articles  and Arrangements  in the  Sumana  Dhar  37947
Uruguay  Round
WPS819  Financial  Indicators  and  Growth  in a  Robert  G. King  January  1992  W. Pitayatonakarn
Cross  Section  of Countries  Ross Levine  37666
WPS820  Taxation  in Decentral.sing  Socialist  Christopher  Heady  January  1992  D. Sebastian
Economies:  The  Case  of China  Pradeep  K. Mira  80423
WPS821  Wages  and Unemployment  in Poland: Fabrizio  Coricelli  January  1992  V. Berthelmes
Recent  Developments  and Policy  Ana Revenga  39175
Issues
WPS822  Paternalism  and  the Alleviation  of  Nancy  Jesurun-Clements January  1992  F. Betancourt
Poverty  18-126
WPS823  How  Private  Enterprise  Organized  Steven  M. Jaffee  January  1992  C. Spooner
Agricultural  Markets  in Kenya  30464
WPS824  Back-of-the-Envelope  Estimates  Sergio  Margulis  January  1992  J. Arevalo
of Environmental  Damage  Costs  in  30745
Mexico
WPS825  The  Empty  Opportunity:  Local  Control Marlaine  E. Lockheed  January  1992  D. Eugene
of Secondary  Schools  and Student  Oinghua  Zhao  33678
Achievement  in the Philippines
WPS826  Do  Workers  in the Informal  Sector  Ariel Fiszbein  January  1992  N. Perez
Benefit  from Cuts  in  the Minimum  31947
Wage?
WPS827  Free  Trade  Agreements  with  the  Refik Erzan  January  1992  J. Jacobson
United  States:  What's  In It for Latin  Alexander  Yeats  33710
America?Plicy Besearch Working  Paper  Series
Contact
iliavAwbm  Do  foE  ago
WPS828 How  the  Macroeconomic  Environment  Arvil  Vsn  Adams  January  1992  V.  Charles
Affects  Human  Resource  Robert  Goldfarb  33651
Development  Terence  Kelly
WPS829 Regulation  of  Securities  Markets:  Terry  M.  Chuppe  January  1992  F. Harbottle
Some  Recent  Trends  and  Their  Michael  Atkin  39616
Implications  for Emerging  Markets
WPS830 Fixed  Parity  of  the  Exchange  Rate  Ibrahim  Elbadawi  January  1992  V.  Barthelmes
and  Economic  Performance  in  the  Nader  Majd  39175
CFA  Zone:  A  Comparative  Study
WPS831 Real  Overvaluation,  Terms  of  Trade  Ibrahim  Elbadawi  January  1992  V. Barthelmes
Shocks,  and  the  Cost  to Agriculture  39175
in Sub-Saharan  Africa
WPS832 Sustainability  and  the  Economics  Richard  B.  Norgaard  January  1992  J. Shin  Yang
of Assuring  Assets  for Future  81418
Generations
WPS833 Stabilization  and  Growth  Recovery  Daniel  F.  Oks  January  1992  L.  Franchini
in Mexico:  Lessons  and  Dilemmas  38835